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Abstract
Unfair stock trading strategies have been shown to be one of the most negative
perceptions that customers can have concerning trading and may result in long-
term losses for a company. Investment banks usually place trading orders for
multiple clients with the same target assets but different order sizes and diverse
requirements such as time frame and risk aversion level, thereby total earning and
individual earning cannot be optimized at the same time. Orders executed earlier
would affect the market price level, so late execution usually means additional
implementation cost. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme that utilizes multi-
agent reinforcement learning systems to derive stock trading strategies for all
clients which keep a balance between revenue and fairness. First, we demonstrate
that Reinforcement learning (RL) is able to learn from experience and adapt the
trading strategies to the complex market environment. Secondly, we show that
the Multi-agent RL system allows developing trading strategies for all clients
individually, thus optimizing individual revenue. Thirdly, we use the Generalized
Gini Index (GGI) aggregation function to control the fairness level of the revenue
across all clients. Lastly, we empirically demonstrate the superiority of the novel
scheme in improving fairness meanwhile maintaining optimization of revenue.
1 Introduction
Developing the right stock trading strategies for the clients is a fundamental function of investment
banks. Traditionally speaking, the ability to maximize trading revenue or minimize cost would be
the main key performance indicator of these financial institutes, as it directly affects the profit of
them. It has been said that, equality is of greater importance these days, as it influences customers’
perceptions of fairness. As long as perceptions of fairness are used by people as a heuristic for trust,
inequality may lead to a destruction of that trust. The execution of orders may lead to the feeling
of unfairness. Investment banks and hedge funds have many clients with the same target assets but
having different requirements including but not limited to order size and execution time frame. The
execution of such orders is a time dependent behavior, as orders can not be executed at the same
time, otherwise, it would cause significant price movement and implementation cost. However, if
orders from clients are executed gradually, the early tradings would affect the implementation cost
and risk of later tradings. A disagreement between the distribution of cost, risk and profit is known to
affect the relationship between customers and sellers. As an instance, if customers believe that an
investment bank prefers big volume orders so that these orders would be executed when there is low
risk and high revenue, and their orders are relatively small, they would turn to other investment banks.
Fairness is a concept that has conventionally been studied in economics [1] and political philosophy
[2]. Recently, it has also become an important consideration in other applied fields, such as applied
mathematics [3] which focuses on solving fair optimization problems, machine learning [4–7]
whose data source could be highly-biased and artificial intelligence [8] when investigating multi-
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agent systems. While an equal distribution of resources across all members within a group seems
ideal, researchers have shown that inequalities are deemed appropriate [9], particularly when they
optimize the outcome of the group. On the other hand, perceived inequalities have a strong impact
on individuals’ behavior, often motivating them to act contrarily to their rational self-interest to
eliminate inequality [10]. Although fairness is a key notion when dealing with multiple parties,
it has only recently received attention in reinforcement learning. Also, fairness is only recently
been emphasized by the financial industry, which pays attention to fairness in capital risk allocation,
resource distribution and dynamic pricing.
In this paper, we propose to use multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) to resolve the fairness
issue in stock trading. Reinforcement learning consists of agents interacting with the environment to
learn an optimal policy by trial and error for sequential decision-making problems. It can develop
optimal trading strategies in a stochastic stock trading market and optimize trading revenue. A
multi-agent system means that we can build trading strategies for all clients individually. This is an
important property as different clients have various requirements in stock trading, thus we cannot
model different trading time frames, risk aversion level with single-agent reinforcement learning
algorithm. Moreover, the multi-agent system improves the scalability of the system. Developing a
trading strategy for one client with one RL agent is simple and convenient. Communication among
these agents is anticipated to resolve the fairness issue related to stock trading. We use Generalized
Gini Index aggregation function to measure the fairness level of the revenue across all clients.
The main contribution of this paper is the integration of fairness in the algorithm training process.
We propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning training paradigm considering fairness level
during the training process. First, we demonstrate that the algorithm can learn from experience and
develop optimal trading strategies in a simulated trading environment. Secondly, we describe the way
to integrate fairness in multi-agent RL algorithms. Agents would receive not only the environment
observations but also the fairness metric. Thirdly, we empirically show that by taking into account
fairness in the training process, the group would still achieve a comparable level of total utility, while
keeping a balance between revenue and fairness. The total group utility, risk and cost are more
equally distributed across all individuals within that group.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the trading problem,
especially the liquidation problem, reviews the Almgren-Chriss model that is used to simulate the
market environment and formulate the concept of fairness. Section 3 introduces the detailed settings
of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm. Section 4 presents the experimental results where
we test our algorithms. Section 5 concludes this paper and points out some future directions.
2 Problem Description
In this section, we first describe the trading problem. To simplify the trading problem, we use the
liquidation problem as an example of trading in this paper and explain why it is feasible to use
reinforcement learning algorithms to address it. Then we describe the Almgren and Chriss model or
the trading environment. Lastly, we introduce Generalized Gini Index which measures fairness level
among clients.
2.1 Optimal Liquidation Problem
We consider a trader who aims to sell X shares of one stock within a time frame T . Liquidator’s
personal characteristics, such as risk aversion level λ, would remain unchanged throughout the
process. The trader can either sell or not sell stocks, but cannot buy any stock during the time frame
T . On the last day of the time frame, the liquidation process ends and the number of shares should be
0. Since the trading volume is tremendous, the market price P will drop during selling, temporarily
or permanently, potentially resulting in enormous trading costs.
The trader or the representative financial institute seeks to find an optimal selling strategy, minimizing
the expected trading cost E(X), or called implementation shortfall, subject to certain optimization
criterion. The trader would know all the environment information including price, historical price
and number of trading days remaining. If there are J traders, they would not know other traders’
information. For instance, they would not know other traders’ remaining shares or risk aversion
levels.
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Based on the assumption that the trading would have market impacts as well as that agents and
environment are interactive, it is feasible to train agents in the environment and derive liquidation
strategies with reinforcement learning algorithms.
2.2 Environment Model for the Simulation
The problem of an optimal liquidation strategy is investigated by using the Almgren-Chriss market
impact model [11] on the background that the agents liquidate assets completely in a given time
frame. The impact of the stock market is divided into three components: unaffected price process,
permanent impact, and temporary impact. The stochastic component of the price process exists, but
is eliminated from the mean-variance. The price process permits linear functions of permanent and
temporary price. Therefore, the model serves as the trading environment such that when agents make
selling decisions, the environment would return price information.
The price process of the Almgren and Chriss model [11] is as follows:
• Price under temporary and permanent impact
Pk = Pk−1 + στ1/2ξk − τg(nk
τ
), k = 1, . . . , N
where σ represents the volatility of the stock, ξk are random variables with zero mean and
unit variance, g(v) is a function of the average rate of the trading, v = nk/τ during time
interval tk−1 to tk, nk is the number of shares to sell during time interval tk−1 to tk, N is
the total number of trades and τ = T/N .
• Inventory process: xtk = X −
∑k
j=1 nj , where xtk is the number of shares remaining at
time tk, with xT = 0.
• Linear permanent impact function g(v) = γv, where v = nkτ .
• Temporary impact function h(nkτ ) =  sgn(nk) + ητ nk, where a reasonable estimate of 
is the fixed costs of selling, and η depends on internal and transient aspects of the market
micro-structure.
• Parameters σ, γ, η, , time frame T , number of trades N are set at t = 0.
3 Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithms
We model the liquidation process as a Markov decision process (MDP), and then formulate the
multi-agent setting used to resolve the problem. The training diagram is also covered, which explains
how multiple agents interact and learn from environment in details. We use implementation shortfall
as the metric of selling cost, and the properties of MDP process allows us to define the goal as
minimizing the expected implementation shortfall.
3.1 Liquidation as a MDP Problem
Considering the stochastic and interactive nature of the trading market, we model the stock trading
process as a Markov decision process, which is specified as follows:
• State s = [r,m, l]: a set that includes the information of the log-return r ∈ RD+ , where D is
the number of days of log-return, and the remaining number of trades m normalized by the
total number of trades, the remaining number of shares l, normalized by the total number of
shares. The log-returns capture information about stock prices before time tk, where k is
the current step. It is important to note that in real world trading scenarios, this state vector
may hold more variables.
• Action a: we interpret the action ak as a selling fraction. In this case, the actions will take
continuous values in between 0 and 1.
3
• Reward R(s, a): to define the reward function, we use the difference between two consecu-
tive utility functions. The utility function is given by:
U(x) = E(x) + λV (x), (1)
E(x) =
N∑
k=1
τxkg(
nk
τ
) +
N∑
k=1
nkh(
nk
τ
), (2)
V (x) = σ2
N∑
k=1
τx2k, (3)
where λ is the risk aversion level, and x is the trading trajectory or the vector of shares
remaining at each time step k, 0 ≤ tk ≤ T . After each time step, we compute the
utility using the equations for E(x) and V (x) from the Almgren and Chriss model for the
remaining time and inventory while holding parameter λ constant. Denoting the optimal
trading trajectory computed at time t by x∗t , we define the reward as:
Rt = Ut(x
∗
t )− Ut+1(x∗t+1). (4)
• Policy pi(s): The liquidation strategy of stocks at state s. It is essentially the distribution of
selling percentage a at state s.
• Action-value function Qpi(s, a): the expected reward achieved by action a at state s, follow-
ing policy pi.
3.2 Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning Setting
The advantage of multi-agent over single-agent reinforcement learning is the ability to incorporate
high-level complexities in the system. The single-agent environment is a special case where the
number of agents J = 1. It simplifies the problem and would automatically inherit all properties
from the multi-agent environment. Following the MDP configuration in the last section, we specify
our multi-agent reinforcement learning setting as follows:
• States s = [r,m, l] : in a multi-agent environment, the state vector should have information
about the remaining stocks of each agent. Therefore, in a J agents environment, the state
vector at time tk would be:
[rk−D, . . . , rk−1, rk,mk, l1,k, . . . , lJ,k],
where
– rk = log( PkPk−1 ) is the log-return at time tk.
– mk = NkN is the number of trades remaining at time tk normalized by the total number
of trades.
– lj,k =
xj,k
Xj
is the remaining number of shares for agent j at time tk normalized by the
total number of shares.
• Action a: using the interpretation in Section 3.1, we can determine the number of shares to
sell for each at each time step using:
nj,k = aj,k × xj,k,
where xj,k is the number of remaining shares at time tk for agent j.
• Reward R(s, a): denoting the optimal trading trajectory computed at time t for agent j by
x∗j,t, we define the reward as:
Rj,t = Uj,t(x
∗
j,t)− Uj,t+1(x∗j,t+1). (5)
• Observation O: Each agent only observes limited state information [12]. In other words, in
addition to the environment information, each agent only knows its own remaining shares,
but not other agents’ remaining shares. The observation vector at time tk for agent j is:
Oj,k = [rk−D, . . . , rk−1, rk,mk, lj,k].
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3.3 Fairness
Fairness can be defined in a theoretically-founded way [1] and relies on two key principles. The
first one (P1) is called “Equal treatment of equals”, which states that two users/stakeholders (with
identical characteristics with respect to the optimization problem, as assumed in this paper) should be
treated the same way. The second one (P2), called the Pigou-Dalton principle, is based on the notion
of Pigou-Dalton transfer, which is a payoff transfer from a richer user/stakeholder to a poorer one
without reversing their relative ranking. The Pigou-Dalton principle states that such transfers lead to
more equitable distributions. Formally, for any v ∈ Rn where vi < vj and for any  ∈ (0, vj − vi)
we prefer v + 1i − 1j to v where 1i (resp. 1j ) is the canonical vector, null everywhere except
in component i (resp. j) where it is equal to 1. In other words, this principle states that, all other
things being equal, we prefer more “balanced” distributions (i.e., vectors) of payoffs. Besides those
two principles, as we are in an optimization context, an efficiency principle (P3) is also required,
which states that given two payoff distributions, if one vector Pareto-dominates another, the former is
preferred to the latter.
Those three principles imply that a fair welfare function that aggregates the payoffs of the
users/stakeholders needs to satisfy three properties. They have to be symmetric (i.e., independent to
the order of its arguments for P1), strictly Schurconcave (i.e., monotonic with respect to Pigou-Dalton
transfers for P2) and strictly increasing (i.e., monotonic with respect to Pareto dominance for P3).
The elementary approach based on maximin (or Egalitarian approach), where one aims at maximizing
the worse-off user/stakeholder, does not satisfy the last two properties. A better approach is based on
the lexicographic maximin, which consists in comparing first the worse-off user/stakeholder when
comparing two vectors, then in the case of a tie, comparing the second worse-off and so on. However,
due to the non-compensatory nature of the min operator, vector (1, 1, ..., 1) would be preferred to
(0, 100, ..., 100), which may be debatable.
Many fair welfare functions have been proposed. In practice, the choice of a suitable function
depends on the application domain. For illustration, we present the fair welfare function based on the
Generalized Gini Index [13] Gw : Rn → R:
Gw(v) =
∑
i
wivi (6)
where w ∈ [0, 1]n is a weight vector such as w1 > w2 > . . . > wn, and (v1, v2, . . . , vn) is the payoff
vector v reordered in an increasing fashion.
Function Gw contains the welfare function induced by the classic Gini index or the Bonferroni index.
We adjust the reward observed by the agents in our MARL algorithm by following updating function:
Rj,t := Rj,t − wjGw,t(R·,t), (7)
where R·,t is the reward vector received by all agents, w is the weight vector computed by the
percentage of initial shares of each agent to the total selling volume.
3.4 Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
We adopt the Actor-Critic [14, 15] method that uses neural networks to approximate both the Q-value
and the action. The critic learns the Q-value function and uses it to update actor’s policy parameters.
The critic network estimates the expected return of a state-action pair. The actor brings the advantage
of computing continuous actions without the need of a Q-value function, while the critic supplies the
actor with knowledge of the performance. The actor network has state s as input and returns action a
directly. Actor-critic methods usually have good convergence properties, in contrast to critic-only
methods.
The Deep Deterministic Policy Gradients (DDPG) algorithm [16] is one example of an actor-critic
method. We will use DDPG to generate the optimal execution strategy of liquidation. DDPG uses
three skills to make sure that it gets converged experimental results: experience replay buffer, learning
rate and exploration noise. Experienced replay method [17] enables the stochastic gradient decent
method and removes correlations between consecutive transitions. Learning rate controls the updating
speed of the neural network. Exploration noise addresses the exploration and exploitation trade-off.
With these training skills, the agent would learn from trail and error and find the optimal trading
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Algorithm 1 Multi-agent DDPG
Input: number of episodes M , time frame T , minibatch size N , learning rate λ, and number of
agents or intersections J
1: for j = 1, J do
2: Randomly initialize critic network Qj(Oj , a|θQj ) and actor network µj(Oj |θµj ) with random
weight θQj and θ
µ
j for agent j;
3: Initialize target network Q′j and µ
′
j with weights θ
Q′
j ← θQj , θµ
′
j ← θµj for each agent j;
4: Initialize replay buffer Bj for each agent j;
5: end for
6: for episode = 1,M do
7: Initialize a random process N for action exploration;
8: Receive initial observation state s0;
9: for t = 1, T do
10: for j = 1, J do
11: Select action aj,t = µj(Oj,t|θµj ) +Nt according to the current policy and exploration
noise;
12: end for
13: Each agent executes action aj,t, market state changes to st+1;
14: Each agent observes reward rj,t and observation Oj,t+1, where observation Oj,t+1 is
adjusted according to spatial influence;
15: Each agent adjust reward according to Equation 7
16: for j = 1, J do
17: Store transition (Oj,t, aj,t, rj,t, Oj,t+1) in Bj ;
18: Sample a random minibatch of N transitions (Oj,i , aj,i , rj,i , Oj,i+1) from Bj ;
19: Set yj,i = rj,i + γQ′j(st+1, µ
′
j(Oj,i+1|θµ
′
j |θQ
′
j )) for i = 1, . . . , N ;
20: Update the critic by minimizing the loss: L = 1N
∑
i(yj,i −Qj(Oj,i, aj,i|θQj ))2;
21: Update the actor policy by using the sampled policy gradient:
∇θµpi ≈ 1
N
∑
i
∇aQj(O, a|θQj )|O=Oj,i,a=µj(Oj,i) × ∇θµµj(Oj |θµ)|si ;
22: Update the target networks: θQ
′
j ← τθQj + (1− τ)θQ
′
j , θ
µ′
j ← τθµj + (1− τ)θµ
′
j .
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
trajectory that minimizes the trading cost. In other words, we will use the DDPG algorithm or
Algorithm 1 to solve the optimal liquidation problem.
4 Performance Evaluation
We first describe the simulation environment in detail. We then use experimental results to demonstrate
that for both plain DDPG algorithm and fairness integrated algorithm, the agents can learn optimal
trading strategies. Moreover, for fairness integrated algorithm, the distributions of profit, cost and
risk, which are measured by total utility, expected implementation shortfall and expected variance,
respectively, are more evenly distributed within the group and fairly between groups.
We implement a typical reinforcement learning workflow to train the actor and critic. We change the
single-agent Almgren and Chriss model [11] settings to build the multi-agent environment. We adjust
reward functions to integrate fairness component. We use Alg. 1 to find a policy that can generate the
optimal trading trajectory with minimum implementation shortfall. We feed the states observed from
our simulator to each agent. These agents first predict actions using the actor model and perform
these actions in the environment. Then, the environment returns their rewards and new states. This
process continues for a given number of episodes.
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(a) Implementation Shortfall (b) Variance
Figure 1: The total expected implementation shortfall (a) and total expected variance (b) for all clients
converges to the same level for both algorithms.
(a) Implementation Shortfall (b) Variance
Figure 2: (a) The plain RL algorithm has larger inequalities both between groups and within the
group. (b) Both algorithms have almost the same level of variance, which is a measure of risk.
4.1 Simulation Environment
This environment simulates stock prices that follow a discrete arithmetic random walk, and that the
permanent and temporary market impact functions are linear functions of the rate of trading, as in the
Almgren and Chriss model [11].
We set the initial stock price to be P0 = 50. The stock price has 20% annual volatility, a bid-ask
spread of 1/8, the difference between ask price and bid price, and an average daily trading volume of
50 million shares. Assuming that there are 250 trading days in a year, this gives a daily volatility in
stock price of 0.12/
√
250 ≈ 0.8% . We use a liquidation time frame of T = 60 days and we set the
number of trades N = 240. This leads to τ = TN = 4 , which means that we will be making four
trades per day. These settings are changeable and can be adjusted to same day liquidation as well.
For the temporary cost function, we set the fixed cost of selling to be 1/2 of the bid-ask spread, so
 = 1/16. We set η such that for each one percent of the daily volume we trade, the price impact
equals to the bid-ask spread. For example, trading at a rate of 5% of the daily trading volume incurs a
one-time cost on each trade of 5/8. Under this assumption we have η = (1/8)/(0.01× 5× 107) =
2.5× 107.
For the permanent costs, a common rule of thumb is that price effects become significant when
we sell 10% of the daily volume. Here, by "significant" we mean that the price depression is one
bid-ask spread, and that the effect is linear for both smaller and larger trading rates, then we have
γ = (1/8)/(0.1× 5× 107) = 2.5× 108.
4.2 Experimental Results
We use 6 agents to develop trading strategies for 6 clients. They have 500k, 500k, 100k,100k,20k
and 20k shares to sell, respectively. They have the same level of risk-aversion level λ = 1e − 4,
and trading time frame T = 60, etc. Their only difference is the trading volumes. We assess both
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the implementation shortfall and expected variance to demonstrate the superiority. The traditional
multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm, which we call plain algorithm, and fairness integrated
multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm are implemented to verify our expectations.
4.2.1 Convergence
Figure 1 shows that both algorithms have the ability to optimize the trading strategies, which implies
that the adjustment of the reward function does not affect the capability of the algorithm to learn the
optimal trading strategy. Moreover, the variance converges to the same level, which is an illustration
that the adjustment does not affect the total risk as well.
Therefore, the adjustment of the RL algorithm does not affect either the total revenue or total risk of
stock trading. It is important because if the adjustment changes the total implementation shortfall,
it will affect the expected return of investment banks and hedge funds. Financial institutes are less
likely to sacrifice revenue for fairness. Thus it builds the foundation for the pursuit of fairness for
clients.
4.2.2 Fairness
Figure 2 shows that at the same level of total implementation shortfall, the adjusted RL algorithm has
more evenly distributed profits. The profit level of clients from the same customers is closer in this
case, which implies a fairer allocation of profit. Besides, we notice that it happens to variance as well.
Therefore, for clients who have the same amount of stocks to sell, their implementation shortfall and
risk would be similar, even though their orders are executed with sequence.
In conclusion, the adjustment of reward function makes the distribution of profit, cost and risk fairer
without sacrificing the total revenue and risk of the financial institutes. The fairness in profits ,cost
and risk allocation helps both maintaining current clients and acquisition of new clients.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme that integrated the fairness factor into the reinforcement
learning algorithm. By using the Generalized Gini Index as a measure of fairness to adjust the reward
in a multi-agent environment, agents can learn new liquidation policies that could achieve the same
level of revenue while keeping a balance between revenue, cost and risk. The ability to maintain
revenue is the main factor that makes the adjusted algorithm feasible and practical as it does not
affect the earning capabilities of investment banks and hedge funds. Moreover, by considering the
fairness factor in the training process, clients will be more satisfied with the service as long as the
perceptions of fairness are used by clients as a heuristic for trust.
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